Broussard & Cullen, P.A.

LaBlanc v. City of West Palm Beach; 1st DCA reverses JCC

In a recent case published by the First DCA, LaBlanc v. City of West Palm Beach the issue was whether Claimant’s condition of cardiac arrhythmia was compensable. There was no dispute that Claimant satisfied each of the requirements of section 112.18. Instead, the dispute was whether the employer presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.

Definition of heart disease as contemplated by Presumption Statute

This letter will serve to update you on a recent decision published by the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) in City of Venice and PGCS v. Michael van Dyke. In this decision, the First DCA addressed the definition of “heart disease” as contemplated by the presumption statute.

In this case, the E/C appealed the Judge of Compensation Claim’s Order finding Claimant’s thoracic aortic disease compensable under the presumption. Specifically, the E/C argued that this condition was not “heart disease.” In support of this argument, the E/C asserted that the exact structure affected by the condition, the ascending aorta, is not “in the heart.”

Gore v. Lee County School Board and Johns Eastern Company - Statute of Limitations Defense

In a recent decision published by the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA), Gore v. Lee County School Board and Johns Eastern Company, the statute of limitations defense was addressed.

In this case, the Claimant appealed the Judge of Compensation Claim’s Order denying her claim for benefits on the ground that same was barred by the statute of limitations.The Judge’s decision was based on his rejection of Claimant’s argument that her prosthesis, inserted into the Claimant’s leg in her 2002 surgery, represented a continuous provision of remedial care that tolled the statute of limitations (pursuant to section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (2001)). He noted that, in 1993, the Legislature removed the statutory provision found in section 440.19(1)(b) excepting prosthesis from the statute, which he interpreted as being an intentional, specific alteration of the law. And, as this was the only alleged “treatment” that transpired between the surgery and Claimant’s 2009 Petition for Benefits, the JCC found that the claim was barred by the statute, and denied the claim.

Gauthier v. Florida International University et seq; Statute of Limitations Defense

This is an update on a recent decision published by the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) in Gauthier v. Florida International University and Division of Risk Management, State of Florida. In this decision, the First DCA addressed the statute of limitations defense.

In this case, the Claimant appealed a JCC’s Order denying her claims for benefits on the grounds that same were barred by the statute of limitations. The Judge’s decision was based on the fact that over one year (approximately 14 months) elapsed between Claimant’s appointments with her authorized provider, the Bascom Palmer Eye Institute.

Effects of Senate Bill 2176

On June 1, 2010, Governor Crist approved senate bill No. 2176, which was codified as Chapter Law 2010-175. The law contains significant changes to (1) the course and scope of employment of deputy sheriffs; and (2) the availability of the section 112.18 presumption to law enforcement, correctional, and correctional probations officers. A summary of the specific provisions are as follows:

Disability in the Context of Presumption Analysis

This will update you on a recent decision published by the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) in Martz v. Volusia County Fire Services/County of Volusia Risk Management. In this decision, the First DCA addressed the issue of disability in the context of the presumption analysis.

In this case, the Claimant challenged the finding of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) that he was not entitled to the presumption afforded by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes. Claimant specifically asserted that the JCC erred by 1) finding Claimant failed to satisfy the disability requirement of the statutory presumption, with respect to his heart disease; and 2) finding Claimant was not entitled to compensation for treatment of his hypertension under the “hindrance to recovery doctrine.” The First DCA affirmed as to the second issue without further comment.

Admissibility of medical opinions

This letter will serve to update you on a recent decision published by the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) in Russell v. Orange County Public Schools Transportation and United Self-Insured. In this decision, the First DCA addressed the issue of the admissibility of medical opinions.

In this case, the Claimant challenged the JCC’s refusal to order an expert medical advisor (EMA) based on the disagreement of two medical opinions. .

Contact The Firm


Broussard & Cullen, P.A. 445 West Colonial Drive Orlando, Fl 32804 P: 407.649.8717 F: 407.649.8680 E: info@bcdorlando.com
	Home \| About the Firm \| Attorneys \| Staff \| Legal Developments \| Resource Center \| Contact Disclaimer \| Privacy Statement \| Site Map © 2011 by Broussard & Cullen, P.A. All rights reserved.