| Admissibility of medical opinions |
| CASE
LAW UPDATE This letter will serve to update you on a recent decision
published by the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) in Russell v.
Orange County Public Schools Transportation and United Self-Insured. In this decision, the First DCA addressed the
issue of the admissibility of medical opinions. In this case, the Claimant challenged the JCC’s refusal to
order an expert medical advisor (EMA) based on the disagreement of two medical
opinions. In her request for an EMA,
Claimant had cited a disagreement between two orthopedic providers, Dr. Richard
Smith and Dr. Jeffrey Rosen. Dr. Rosen,
Claimant’s later authorized orthopedic provider, opined in his deposition that
Claimant’s accident was not the major contributing cause of her current
knee condition. Dr. Smith testified to
the contrary. Still, the JCC denied the
request for an EMA, finding “the foundational support for the conflict did not
exist because the opinion that reportedly established the conflict came from a
physician whose opinion could not be accepted pursuant to section
440.13(5)(e).” This, as Dr. Smith had
apparently been deauthorized. The Court reversed the JCC’s decision to exclude the
testimony of Dr. Smith (and, therefore, failure to order an EMA as required by
the statutes). It first noted that
section 440.13(5)(e) does provide that opinions of authorized treating
providers are admissible in proceedings before the JCC. The Court then noted the definition of
“authorized treating provider” as being a “provider who has been authorized by
an E/SA.” The issue of whether a
de-authorized provider could provide opinion testimony was a question of first
impression, however. The Court then turned its analysis to statutory
construction, first noting that a plain reading of the statute did not offer
any guidance. Consequently, it focused
on the legislative intent behind section 440.13(5)(e). Section 440.13 was amended in 1993 to include
subsection (5)(e), limiting medical opinion testimony to EMAs, authorized providers,
and IMEs. Section 440.015, Florida
Statutes, was also amended at that time to include language pertaining to the
nature of workers’ compensation as being self-executing so as to ensure a
prompt and cost-effective delivery of payments and benefits to the injured
worker. Based on its understanding of the legislative intent behind
section 440.13(5)(e), the Court found that “interpreting [the statute] to
preclude the admission of a de-authorized physician’s medical opinion would
contravene the purposes of both section 440.13(5)(e) and chapter 440.” The Court specifically noted that such an
interpretation would allow an E/SA to de-authorize a physician in order to
preclude his/her opinion from coming into the record, or a claimant to request
a one-time change. After all, it was
this type of “doctor shopping” that culminated in the 1993 amendments in the
first place. (The Court cited The
Governor’s Worker’s Compensation Reform Proposal for this proposition.) Finally, the Court noted that the
“gamesmanship” of last minute de-authorizations and authorizations would defeat
the purpose outlined in section 440.015, as same could cause meaningful delays
in petition for benefits hearings and hinder a prompt determination of whether
the claimant is due payments and/or services. Based on the foregoing, and the “absurd results” potentially
resulting from the JCC’s interpretation thereof, the Court found that the JCC
erred in excluding Dr. Smith’s testimony, and in failing to order an EMA as
required by the statutes. The facts of this case are somewhat unclear, in that it is
impossible to tell why Dr. Smith was deauthorized. As you know, there are numerous instances
wherein a doctor might be deauthorized, e.g., a one-time change,
over-utilization, or a second opinion.
Still, this case appears to stand for the proposition that
deauthorization for any number of reasons will not render the deauthorized
physician’s opinions inadmissible. I
would note, however, that this decision is not final, as both parties have 15
days from the April 20, 2010 date of issuance of the decision to move for
re-hearing. Kristen L. Magana
Broussard, Cullen & DeGailler, P.A. |

